The Campaign

     During the planning of the Saratoga campaign there was little thought given to the terrain features the British Army would have to face.  Germain, who "was responsible for grand strategy, which included the staggering logistical task of assembling supplies and transporting them to America, determining how Britain's resources would be employed and distributed to the various theatres of war, and appointing the field commanders," did not have any "real comprehension or appreciation of the distances and natural obstacles an army would encounter in America (Ketchum, 69).  Burgoyne was able to convince Germain that Guy Carleton, his commanding officer in Canada, had not done his level best to defeat the Rebels at Fort Ticonderoga during the previous campaign.  He instead came forward with a plan that he believed would be very detrimental to the rebellion.  The course of action he decided upon, as stated previously in the introduction, was to separate the New England colonies.  To do this, the British would use a route that ran from Lake Champlain overland to Lake George, then to the Hudson River and New York.  Sir William Howe, who was senior commander of British forces in America, had sent word to England that he wanted to open communication with Canada during the 1777 campaign--this meant that the Hudson had to be controlled.  With that, it seemed essential to have a British Army attack from Canada down the Hudson.  This army would be led by Burgoyne, for he was able to impress Germain and King George III.  How the entire Northern Campaign would pan out was up to argument. 

     The midpoint, Albany, was strategically important and would be Burgoyne's objective.  While that is simple enough, there were serious questions that were not answered.  Once at Albany would he be given instructions from Howe, or would Howe come and link up with Burgoyne at Albany, or would Burgoyne move down the Hudson and link up with Howe to move on Washington's Army?  Or perhaps '''junction' did not imply a merger of the two forces but merely control of the Hudson by means of a string of strong points bolstered by ships of the Royal Navy" (Ketchum, 262).  Any of those scenarios allowed the British to control the Hudson, open communications with Canada, and cut off the New England colonies.  But there was no clear order as to what was to happen, and because of that discrepancy the entire plan would come to naught.   It was stated that "He [Burgoyne] was to 'force his way to Albany,' where he and the task group moving east along the Mohawk would rendezvous and place themselves under Howe's command" (Ketchum, 85).  That is really all Howe knew of the plan and therefore went through with his plan to move on Philadelphia--this move would move him away from Burgoyne and would make any assistance from him impossible, yet Germain endorsed Howe's plan.  Thus, there were two major British actions occurring in the Northern Colonies that were not going to compliment one another.

     Miscommunications aside, Burgoyne was still set to go out and win glory for himself and Britain.  The Northern Army in Canada was divided into three elements: those under Burgoyne's command, those under Carleton's command (who would stay in Quebec), and those under Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger.  St. Leger has a small part in the campaign.  He was to lead over 1,200 troops "to Niagara, and from there across Lake Ontario to Oswego" where he would then "march east against Fort Stanwix and, after taking it, proceed down the Mohawk River to Join Burgoyne at Albany" (Ketchum, 103).  That move, all in all, would cut the supply line of the Rebels. 

     In Burgoyne's army there existed a heavy German influence.  There were 3,981 British troops and 3, 116 Brunswick and Hesse-Hanau troops.  Both the British and German troops were seasoned soldiers but unaccustomed to fighting in the terrain they were to be in.  The first objective was Fort Ticonderoga.

     Arthur St. Clair was in charge of the defenses at Ticonderoga but was severely undermanned, for the defense of the area would require many men.  There were three main positions to the area: Fort Ticonderoga itself, Mount Independence, and Mount Defiance.  Both the Fort and Mount Independence were defended, but Mount Defiance was not because it was out of musket rage and believed to be unusable by artillery.  Yet on July 5th there fired from Mount Defiance a British Battery.  With that position they commanded Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence.  St. Clair was forced to retreat during the night and give up Fort Ticonderoga without a fight. 

     The British pursued the retreating rebels and were able to catch up with them at Hubbardton.  The brisk and hot battle that ensued cost the British sixty dead, 168 wounded and the Americans forty-one dead, ninety-six wounded and over two hundred taken prisoner.  The British then moved on and took Ft. Anne.  Not wanting his soldiers to backtrack, Burgoyne decided they would continue overland to Ft. Edward, which was sixteen miles away.  The British army would march through dense woods with, because of Schuyler's orders, felled trees that would make their trek take the better part of a month.  Besides the delay in time this would cause, Burgoyne also had no reinforcements forthcoming.  This meant the losses at Hubbardton and Fort Anne were irreplaceable.  To make matters worse there on his left flank Rebels started to form up.  This was partly due to the fact that civilians were murderously treated by Burgoyne's Indian allies. 

     The main incident of note occurred against Jane McCrea.  She was a reddish-haired beauty engaged to a British officer.  Some Indians took her prisoner but got into an argument about to whom she belonged.  One Indian ended up murdering her, mutilating her body, and scalping her.  When he returned to the British camp with her hair, her fiancée recognized her and was obviously badly shaken.  This incident spread throughout the countryside, and others like it called many colonials to arms against the British.

     With the threat on his left growing, Burgoyne sent Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, leader of a German detachment, to deal with the problem and also get some much-needed supplies from the British.  Baum engaged Brigadier General John Stark at Bennington.  The Germans and loyalists were outnumbered and took cover behind redoubts, but because they were situated far from each other, they were taken one by one.  The fighting was "bedlam with the deafening slam of muskets at close quarters, men screaming, shouting, and cursing, and suddenly the Germans were struggling desperately to get out before they were slaughtered" (Ketchum, 309).  Baum had requested reinforcements, and Burgoyne obliged by sending Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Breymann, who took his time getting there.  He took so much time, in fact, that by the time he arrived at Bennington, the battle was over, and the rebels pounced on his troops, pushing him back as well.  The loss at Bennington was a hard blow to Burgoyne, for he had lost fifteen percent of his forces, and they could not be replaced.  Despite the setback at Bennington, Burgoyne marched on towards Albany.   

            Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger lifted the siege at Fort Stanwix because of a ruse by the Americans.  Arnold allowed Hon Yost Schuyler to "do his best to convince the Indians there that a large rebel army was approaching" (Ketchum, 334).  Because the Indians believed Hon could speak with the Great Spirit, they took his story as fact and fled.  Without his Indian allies, St. Leger was forced to lift siege and retire.  He would be of no help to Burgoyne.